Subcontracting,R&D and labour productivity: a theoretical explanation by Maiti, Dibyendu S. & Marjit, Sugata
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT                               1 
Volume 36, Number 3, September 2011 
 
 
 
SUBCONTRACTING, R&D AND LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY: 
A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION 
 
DIBYENDU MAITI
a
 AND SUGATA MARJIT
b* 
 
a
The University of the South Pacific, Fiji & Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, India 
b
Centre for Studies in Social Science, Calcutta, India 
 
 
While a large body of researches discusses the effects of international subcontracting on 
firm dynamics, the present work deals with the similar issues of a domestic firm who 
subcontracts to the informal sector in a typical developing world. Theoretically, we develop 
a model that if the formal sector wage is higher than that of informal sector, the choice of 
informal sector subcontracting and in-house R&D investment appears to be alternative 
options to the firm to bypass expensive labour in the formal sector. We argue that the R&D 
and labour productivity in formal sector are highly influenced by the informal wage but not 
the formal sector one. Since the subcontracting can raise both supply and demand for 
informal workers due to a rise of formal sector wage, the movement of informal sector wage 
is uncertain and thereby, the formal sector R&D and labour-productivity are also ambiguous. 
Thus, countries with a vast segment of lowly-paid informal workers exhibit 
lowly-productive formal workers. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The pace and pattern of subcontracting or outsourcing not only across borders but 
also within the boarder have been growing evidences in the present day world. To the 
best of our knowledge, the existing research has largely discussed the effect of 
international outsourcing and ignored the similar effects within a domestic country. A 
growing body of literature has narrated the experiences of emerging trend of 
subcontracting largely in the developing world and some of those are available at 
 
* The paper acknowledges the financial supports from the Consortium on the Institutions for Pro-Poor 
Growth Programme (DFID-UK-sponsored) for its preparation. The authors would also like to thank 
anonymous referees for useful suggestions. Usual disclaimers apply. 
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WTO-ILO report (2009). It has been observed that a producer often subcontracts a part 
of the production process to outside agents for various reasons (Maiti, 2008). What 
could be the resultant effect of this subcontracting on in-house R&D and labour 
productivity of a typical formal firm within the country has not been discussed seriously 
and the present study would like to explore this issue in this paper.    
It is understood that the ability of firms to avoid minimum wage laws, certain types 
of taxes, and livelihood needs, for a vast majority of the population leads to the 
formation of the unorganized/informal sector, whose significance can hardly be 
undermined if one is seriously interested in understanding the working condition of a 
typical developing economy. The other important reason for the informal sector to be 
thrived is a variety of low cost non-traded goods and services which require little 
investment but provide employment to a large number of uneducated and otherwise 
jobless people. The developing world captures 60-90 % workforce in the informal 
manufacturing sector which has direct or indirect production linkages to the formal 
producer (WTO-ILO, 2009).1 Several papers in Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur (2006) 
edited volume and WTO-ILO (2009) report analyse the state of informal enterprises in 
the developing world. It is more or less recognized that the informal sector often 
survives through subcontracting by the formal sector in various ways.2 Having this 
inter-sectoral linkage, it appears that R&D and labour productivity of the subcontracted 
firm would no longer be unaffected in a typical dual economy.  
Moreover, it is also well recognized that formal sector jobs receive higher wage than 
what is usually offered to informal workers. Agenor (1996) corroborates such claims. 
Marcouiller et al. (1997) have contradictory evidence for Mexico while reconfirming the 
wage gap for El Salvador and Peru. Earlier, the theoretical model of Carruth and Oswold 
(1981) and later by Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) provide justifications of 
economic dualism between a unionized and non-unionized sector. The later paper uses 
effort observability and worker productivity as possible reasons behind wage-premium 
in the formal sector. Many recent theoretical and empirical evidences support this 
observation. 
We start from a set up with a given wage premium in the formal sector due to either 
more active unionism or government intervention. Since the formal sector activities are 
abided by a set of rules it gives a room to those workers for the formation union and its 
 
1 It absorbs almost 90 % of the workforce in India (Marjit and Maiti, 2009). 
2 One particular issue of concern in recent times has been that how informal workers can face up to the 
challenge of globalization as liberal policies of a reforming economy. Goldberg and Pavnick (2003) and 
Marjit et al. (2007a) argue that liberal trade and investment policies may expand or contract output and 
employment in the informal sector. If liberal trade policies lead to increased profitability, more output is 
likely to be produced in the formal segment. Marjit (2003) and Marjit et al. (2007) show that even if workers 
are laid off in the formal sector and move to casual jobs, the informal wage and employment can still go up 
provided capital can be relocated easily from the formal to the informal sector. 
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interventions. Under such circumstances, the wage in the formal labour market is 
assumed to be determined exogenously by the external institutions. Formal-informal 
division easily occurs along the line of high-low wage. Typically, a firm faced with 
organized union and stringent labour laws looks for workers who can be hired at lower 
than minimum wages without the promise of other fringe benefits. Such casual contracts 
are illegal, but firms can avoid punishment by increasing cost to influence the monitors. 
Such a system survives because poor people need jobs and the governance system turns 
out to be corrupt and reasonably weak.3  
The existence of an informal sector allows some degree of labour market flexibility, 
even at the cost of encouraging an environment where people are employed at low wage 
and under poor working conditions. Social concern for workers having to tolerate a 
disgraceful work environment cannot deny the fact that without jobs they would be 
definitely worse off. However, the existence of a low wage sector acts as if the firms 
have access to a low cost technology, when they have to pay a higher wage to the formal 
workers. This reduces the incentive to search a low cost alternative in the formal sector 
and eventually leads to a lower amount of productivity augmenting R&D expenditure. 
This, in turn, affects average labour productivity in the formal sector. If our conjecture is 
right, ceteris paribus, lower informal wages should imply lower productivity of formal 
sector workers. Since the phenomenon of lower wage in the informal sector generally 
reflects low labour productivity in the informal sector, improving labour condition in the 
informal sector should lead to an improvement in the formal sector productivity as well. 
Given this backdrop, we develop a theoretical framework of a typical firm in a 
developing economy which has two alternative options to avoid expensive formal 
workers. It can either subcontract to the informal sector at cheaper labour cost and/or go 
for in-house R&D to innovate labour saving technology in the in-house production. The 
formal wage is determined by exogenous factors, but the informal wage is endogenously 
determined by the market. However, it is assumed that the informal sector wage does not 
adjust quickly in the short run. Through a rise in the formal wage, if the government 
allows informal activities to be thrived, a formal producer would take advantage of this 
and would be reluctant to go for in-house R&D investment. Therefore, the firm prefers 
to subcontract to the informal sector and this acts as a binding condition of productivity 
improvement of formal workers. As a result, the demand for informal labour would rise 
leading to an increase in the wage. Now in the short-run, if the resultant informal wage 
rises, the firm effectively cuts back the subcontracting and goes for in-house R&D 
initiative which eventually leads to a rise in the labour productivity of formal workers. 
Therefore, the informal wage and formal sector labour productivity would be highly 
correlated.  
 
3 Dasgupta and Marjit (2006) and Marjit et al. (2007a) argue that the informal sector may be the outcome 
of a deliberate strategy of the government in a poor country, either to exert pressure on trade unions and/or to 
avoid social unrest in the absence of a well designed and funded social welfare programme for the poor. 
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But in the long-run, the informal wage is adjusted by the market. A rise in the formal 
sector wage leads to a rise of demand for informal production, and resultant employment, 
and also the firm releases some labour to the informal sector. This increases supply of 
workers in the informal sector. The net effect of these two forces determines the level of 
employment and wage in the sector. Now, if the resultant informal wage rises in 
response to these interactions, the formal R&D and labour productivity might improve, 
otherwise not.  
We find supportive results to establish our relationship from a country study. In 
India, it clearly defines the boundary of formal and informal sector.4 Marjit and Maiti 
(2009) gathered information from secondary sources of Indian database and ran some 
regressions to study the relationship between wages and productivity. The study 
considers annual emoluments for hired workers in Non-Directory Manufacturing 
Establishments (NDME)5 of the informal sector, reported by National Sample Survey 
Organisation, Government of India, as informal wage and annual emoluments of factory 
workers, reported by Annual Survey of Industries, Government of India, as the formal 
wage, and finds that the formal wage of an ASI worker is, on an average, 2 to 6 times 
higher than the informal wage and this gap varies across regions and over time. The 
study separately ran pooled OLS regression with state and time dummies and panel GLS 
regressions to estimate the relationship between informal wage-formal productivity and 
formal wage-formal productivity controlling other variables. The regression results 
clearly suggest that the correlation between formal wage and formal productivity is not 
significant enough, while it is highly significant between formal labour productivity and 
informal wage. GLS panel regression results are much superior to the OLS results. 
These results essentially reveal that formal productivity is highly influenced by the 
informal wage, but not necessarily by the formal wage. However, the study does not 
discuss about R&D investment of the formal firm due to lack of information in the 
database.  
 
4 As per Indian the Factory Act 1948, the firms which use more than 10 workers with power and more 
than 20 without power come under organized or formal sector. The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), 
Government of India, compiles detailed information of those firms on a regular basis. The firms, which are 
not covered by ASI, fall under the unorganized or informal sector and are free from the Factory Act 1948. 
The information about those firms is procured by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), 
Government of India through the stratified random sample survey in every five year since 1978-79. Those 
reports documented the extent of informality and it is noticeable that maintenance of registration, accounts, 
and payments to labour hardly follow the industrial and labour laws. However, information on wage output 
and other factors of production is covered since 1989-90 and they compile this information for three discrete 
time periods i.e., 1989-90, 1994-95 and 2000-01(Marjit and Maiti, 2009). 
5 The firms, hiring more than five workers, are defined as directory manufacturing establishment (DME). 
Non-directory manufacturing establishments (NDME) and own-account manufacturing establishments 
(OAME) are those who hire 1-5 workers and do not hire workers, respectively. 
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This apart, the formal wage does not necessarily promote the condition of the 
informal sector workers in the long run. For example, if the formal wage increases, the 
firm substitutes production activities from formal to informal sector and that has two 
counteracting effects on informal wage. On the one hand, a typical substitution effect 
would raise the demand for informal workers. The released workers from formal sector, 
due to fall of formal production, on the other hand, would also supply more labour in the 
sector. The net effect is ambiguous. If the informal sector faces a net positive demand 
for workers as a result of change in the formal wage, it would raise employment, not 
wage, in the informal sector when the economy is not under full-employment, and it 
would raise informal wage when the economy is full-employment. But, if the net 
demand is negative, under certain situations, it would reduce informal wage. This may 
not only distort the efficiency gain of formal workers but also deteriorate the condition 
of the informal sector. Thus, a poor economy, or an economy with a substantial number 
of poor people, will also be an economy where the formal sector workers will be less 
productive. This shows that when a society has a lot of poor informal workers, those 
who are fortunate enough to land up with relatively high-wage jobs may not be as 
productive as they would be in a society where access to the low wage informal segment 
is banned or severely restricted. This also means that if two firms in two different 
countries face different institutional climates, that is, one may not have any access to the 
informal workers either because there are none or because it is too costly to access extra 
legal means, and the other faces a much more lustre environment, the institutionally 
more constrained one will have more productive workers. The next sections are 
organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 respectively propose a brief account of literature 
review and the model. The section 4 ends up with concluding observations. 
 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on endogenous growth has illustrated how R&D plays an instrumental 
role in accelerating long-run growth of a country (Romer, 1990). Many works have 
discussed the role of endogenous factors on the R&D and long-run growth in the later 
period, based on country experiences. Some scholars also looked at the role of external 
factors like infrastructure and transportation costs on R&D and long-run growth of the 
country, based on foundation of modern growth theory. For example, Goo (2011) 
showed that the larger are the transportation costs of R&D technology, the higher is the 
price of R&D technology and the slower is endogenous economic growth. Lee (2005) 
empirically shows a direct and stronger effect of information networks on international 
R&D. In an interesting paper, Orlov and Roufagalas (2008) investigated the role of 
stabilization policies on R&D production and long-run growth in presence of economic 
slowdowns. 
The contemporary research has shown enough interests to investigate the strategic 
interactions of firms on their implication of R&D of firms and the performances. For 
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example, Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003), Egger and Egger (2003), Shy and 
Stenbacka (2003), and Antràs and Helpman (2004) establish the advantages of strategic 
outsourcing over other organizational structures such as vertical integration and foreign 
direct investment. 6  Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Jones (2005) respectively 
investigate the impact of outsourcing on the relative wage within the US market and 
compares immigration and local wage. On similar issue, Glass and Saggi (2001) assume 
that both outsourcing and R&D provide avenues for cost reduction and see the effect of 
complementarity and substitutability between them on employment and wage. If 
outsourcing and R&D are complements, outsourcing increases R&D, thus reducing the 
negative impact of outsourcing on wages and employment in the outsourced countries. 
Using almost similar framework, Marjit and Mukherjee (2008) argue that outsourcing 
increases the R&D investment in small markets and in highly competitive product 
markets, whereas it decreases the R&D investment in large markets. If the outsourced 
firm can be technologically very efficient under exporting, outsourcing can make the 
consumers worse off by reducing the R&D investment.  
Such analysis of subcontracting within the domestic economy in the context of 
developing world is under-researched. Usually the efficiency wage models, which talk 
above the positive effect of higher wages (Shapiro and Stigliz, 1984; Banerji and Gupta, 
1998), have shown a direct nutritional and/or incentive effect on labour productivity of 
higher wages. Hence, a decline in wage does mean declining productivity and the 
entrepreneurs might be reluctant to reduce the wage, even in the face of unemployment. 
That is the key argument explaining unemployment and rigid wage at the same time. 
These studies have completely ignored the subcontracting part of a typical firm to the 
informal sector where the wage is predominantly lower than that in the formal sector. 
The works have ignored the possibility that the lower wages in the informal segment 
could act as a disincentive to go for productivity improvement efforts on the part of the 
formal sector entrepreneurs.  
 
 
3.  THE MODEL 
 
We start with simple set up of a developing economy where a single producer is 
working with the use of two forms of workers (formal and informal). If the economy 
consists of a firm who produces a good X, it can be either produced at in-house in the 
formal sector ( 1X ) and subcontracted to the informal sector ( 2X ), where the total 
output is ( 21 XX  ). The quality of products produced is the same in both sectors or are 
not assumed to be substantially different, but the productivity can be higher in the formal 
 
6 Strictly speaking, there is no significant difference between subcontracting and outsourcing, but in the 
paper the former is largely used in the context of movement within boarder and the latter is used for across 
boarder movement.   
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sector because of its usage of advanced technology than those are available in the 
informal sector. For simplicity, we assume that one unit of output to be produced in the 
informal sector requires one unit of workers ( 2X ) and one unit of output to be produced 
in formal sector needs 1X  unit of workers. Here,   is the number of labour required 
to produce one unit of output in the formal sector. Essentially, the inverse of   (or, 
/1 ) can be termed as the formal sector labour productivity. We further assume that 
1  and this condition ensures higher productivity of workers in formal sector than 
those in informal sector.  
Now, the question is why a firm subcontracts to the informal sector. The answer is 
that the firm wants to save expensive workers in the formal sector. If the output is 
produced by using in-house formal workers he must pay a relatively higher wage, 
following institutional rules fixed up by either the trade unions or the government, or 
both. It is mentioned in the previous section that a formal worker receives a wage rate 
which is on an average two to six times higher than the informal wage. If 1w  and 2w  
are, respectively, formal and informal wage rates, where 12 ww  , the firm has clearly 
two strategies to save the cost, either subcontracting to the informal sector and/or taking 
up more R&D efforts for bringing labour-replacing technologies in the in-house formal 
production. We model this trade-off here. 
While in the absence of any noticeable quality gap, the firm tends to hire only 
informal workers at low wages, but it must incur transaction costs for hiring such 
informal workers. Under this conditions, two types of transaction costs are modelled in 
recent literature － extra-legal cost (Marjit et al. 2006) and search cost (Maiti and 
Marjit, 2008). The former argues that hiring informal workers is not legal. Therefore, 
potential regulatory problems are faced by the firm and it is possible for them to avoid 
these problems by offering bribes to the regulators. The latter suggests that 
subcontracting outside involves an additional effort in searching suitable suppliers, 
setting mutually acceptable informal terms and conditions, and mentoring them. Simply, 
we assume that a positive cost, a combination of both, is present for each transaction of 
informal contracting. If 2X  be the amount of final output produced in the informal 
sector, )( 2Xt  is defined as transaction cost where it increases at a constant rate with a 
rise of informal production, that is, 0,0  tt . Therefore, if we assume that a single 
unit of informal workers produces a single unit of output, the firm hires 2X  and the 
total cost would be the wage bills for informal wages ( 22 Xw ) and the amount of 
transaction cost to be incurred to execute these contracts ( 22 Xtw ). In total, this is as 
follows:  
 
)()1( 2222 XcwXwtC  ,                                          (1) 
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where 22 )1()( XtXc  . It can easily be shown that 0,0  cc .7  
Hence, the marginal cost for informal production is )( 22 Xcw  , 0,0  cc . The 
basic logic here is that the larger the size of the informal segment, the greater would be 
the costs to be incurred for such transactions.  
This apart, if the firm is forced to produce in-house, for any reason, the R&D effort 
seeking a labour saving technology would be beneficial. We define that R&D is the level 
of augmenting technology which would essentially enable to save labour per unit of 
output. For example, upgradation of information technology with appropriate software 
for industrial activities can be considered as one form of R&D initiative in the firm. This 
reduces the requirement of labour per unit of output in the formal sector. Further, the 
R&D initiative is assumed to be possible only in the formal sector which can be thought 
of a technology that reduces the marginal cost of production in the in-house production. 
If one unit of X (or X1) in the formal sector requires )(F  units of labour, the total cost 
of formal production is 11 )( XFw  where 0,0   .  
On the other hand, there is another side of R&D initiative in the firm. For any level 
of successful R&D or technological change, the firm needs to incur certain cost. 
Obviously, there would be monotonic relationship between expenditure on R&D sector 
(Z) and actual level of technological (F). But, the whole expenditure should not be 
counted here as real R&D, because a part of the expenditure would be loss in the 
experimental process of successful innovation. Moreover, it engages a set of proper 
personnel with appropriate laboratory who would work through a trial and error process 
to get the desired level of technology (or, R&D) in the firm successfully. These 
essentially account for a cost and the result of such investment provides a certain level of 
technological in the firm, i.e., Z(F). One would also expect that higher the cost higher 
would be level of R&D or technology. Because, more qualified personnel with better 
laboratory can increase the chances of the successful technological change and higher 
order of R&D. Therefore, Z(F) is assumed to follow properties similar to a usual cost 
function, where 0,0,0  ZZZ .  
Now, in order to optimize the surplus, an entrepreneur, facing large informal workers 
at lower wage, has a trade-off, either an increased R&D for in-house production or 
outsource to low paid informal workers, or both. If R(X) is the standard revenue function 
facing the firm, the firm’s optimization problem looks as follows. 
 
)()()()( 2211,, 21
FZXcwXFwXRMax
FXX
  .                      (2) 
 
The following curvature restrictions are assumed: 
 
 
7 02;01 2  tctXtc . 
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0,0,0  RRR , 
 
0,0,0   , 
 
0,0,0  ZZZ , 
 
0,0,0  ccc , 
 
21 XXX  . 
 
The economic interpretations of these conditions have been discussed above. Taking 
these specifications of the model, our intention is clearly to observe the implications of a 
change in formal wage, an exogenous variable in the model, or a rise of subcontracting 
on others in the system. Definitely, a change in formal wage would affect the demand 
for informal labour and, thus, informal wage. The informal wage, which is assumed to 
be market determined, cannot move instantaneously in the short run. Moreover, in the 
presence of a large pool of informal workers in the economy, the wage cannot go below 
the certain minimum subsistence level, because the workers would physically be 
incapable to do work. However, in the long-run, the informal wage is adjusted according 
to the changes in market conditions. Let us discuss the short-run and long-run case 
separately.  
 
Short-Run Case 
 
We assume sequence of the game that the decision on F is taken at first and then X1 
and X2. The model can be solved by the backward induction method. 
From (2), the first order conditions are 
 
)(' 1 FwR  ,                                                   (3) 
 
)( 22 XcwR  .                                                     (4) 
 
While solving for ),( 21 XX , F is taken as given. From (3) and (4), 
 
)()( 221 XcwFw  .                                                 (5) 
 
Let )/)(()/)((~ 2121
1 wFwfwFwcX    , 0f  as 0c .             (6) 
 
Check that for XX ~ , the firm does not employ any formal workers as 
)()( 221 XcwFw  . If XX ~ , XX ~  must be produced in the formal sector as 
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)(')( 221 XcwFw   for XX ~ . We assume that the size of the market is large enough 
to accommodate both in-house production as well as subcontracting (Figure 1). From the 
first order condition (4), we find that )()( 1 FwXR  . We can easily derive X  from 
this relation taking inverse of it. 
 
))(( 1 FwX  , 0  as 0R .                                    (7) 
 
Technically, this is assumed a X  such that the equilibrium prevails with XX ~ . 
This also implies that if the market size is not large enough, only informal workers is 
hired. Therefore, the firm outsources 2
~ XX   units to the informal sector and produce 
)~( XX   in-house. Note that these solutions are derived for a given value of F. We are 
following a backward induction method by which X  and X~  are solved as functions 
of F, then 1)
~( XXX   is substituted in (7) to solve for F. 
 
)()(~
2
1
121 w
wfwXXX   .                                      (8) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Allocation of Formal-informal Production (given F) 
X XX
~O
21, ww  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(1 Fw  
 
 
2w  
)( 22 Xcw 
)(1 Fw  
R
1X2X
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Internalizing Equations (5) and (6) and using the envelope theorem we find the 
following condition to determine optimal F:  
 
'' 11 ZXw   .                                                  (9) 
 
Since )(F  denotes the inverse of labour productivity in the formal sector, our 
task is to check how F responds to changes in 1w  and 2w － the formal and informal 
wage rate. Rewriting and assuming F* is the optimal R&D to start with we have, 
therefore, 
 


  111
* )~()~(1
dw
XXdwXX
dw
dF  ,                              (10) 
 
and 

  212
* )~(1
dw
XXdw
dw
dF  ,                                      (11) 
 
where 011  ZXw   (by the second order condition guaranteeing the optimality 
of F*). 
Since the formal output is the difference of total output and informal output, the 
derivate of the formal output with respect to the formal and informal wage would be:  
 
0)
~(
21

w
f
dw
XXd  ,                                         (12) 
 
and 0)()
~(
2
2
1
2

w
Fwf
dw
XXd  .                                      (13) 
 
The above two equations suggest that the formal output is inversely related to the 
formal wage and positively related to the informal wage. Hence, from (10) and (11), we 
can write 
 
0)()(1
2
1
1
*



  w
fwf
dw
dF  ,                              (14) 
 
0)(1 2
2
1
1
2
*


  w
wfw
dw
dF  .                                        (15) 
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The above-two expressions reveal the effect of change in the wages on the level of 
R&D in the short-run. Now, we can write down the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In the short-run, a rise of informal wage, but not formal wage, must 
improve R&D and labour-productivity in formal sector. 
 
Proof: From (14), we find that 
1
*
dw
dF  could be positive or negative depending on 
the conditions of the right-hand side of the expression. Therefore, the labour 
productivity change in the formal sector is given by  
 
0)(1
)(
1
1
*
*
2
1 





dw
dFF
dw
F
d


. ￭ 
 
So, the formal wage is not highly correlated with the labour productivity in the sector. 
A rise of formal wage has two counteracting effects on F. It directly cuts down total 
production of the firm and, accordingly, reduces F (that is, scale effect). On the other 
hand, two substitution effects can be observed. One, a rise in the formal wage directly 
substitutes formal workers by F within the sector and raises demand for F. Second, it 
pushes up informal subcontracting, cutting down in-house production, and F. The net 
effects of a rise in formal wage on F and the resultant productivity of formal sector 
workers are ambiguous. 
From (17), we find that 0
2
*

dw
dF . Therefore, the labour productivity change in the 
formal sector is given by,  
 
0)(1
)(
1
2
*
*
2
2





dw
dFF
dw
F
d


. ￭ 
 
A rise in informal wage has only one substitution effect but no scale effect. Because, 
it only affects the inter-sectoral distribution of production and does not affect total 
production. A higher 2w  raises in-house production and R&D investment in the formal 
sector. F increases and )(F  drops making labour more productive in formal sector. 
 
Long-Run Case  
 
The informal wage would no longer be an exogenous in the long run, because any 
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change in the formal sector would definitely retaliate and affect the wage in the informal 
labour market through subcontracting linkages. In this case, the structure of the game 
will be a bit of different from the earlier one. At stage 1, F will be determined by the 
firm and the informal wage will be solved in stage 2. Sectoral outputs will be determined 
in the stage 3. Accordingly, the profit is realised by the firm. The objective function of a 
formal producer is as in Equation (1) and as per backward induction method the sectoral 
outputs, wages and R&D would be solved, respectively.  
Since the objective function is same, the optimum outputs in formal and informal 
sector are as earlier, i.e.,  
 
)(~
2
1
2 w
wfXX  , and )()(~
2
1
121 w
wfwXXX   .  
 
The formal wage is exogenously determined by the institutions at 1w . On the other 
hand, the informal wage will be determined by labour market conditions. Given a formal 
wage, the demand for informal labour is )(
2
1
2 w
wfL  , where the demand is inversely 
related to the informal wage and positively related to the formal wage. Also, given the 
same wage, the demand for formal labour will be  
 


  )()(
2
1
111 w
wfwXL  .                                     (16) 
 
Therefore, the total demand for labour by the firm, combining both formal and 
informal workers in the economy, is 21 XXL
d  . It can be written as follows: 
 
)()1()(
2
1
1 w
wfwLd   .                                       (17) 
 
It should be noted that the demand for total labour depends on the informal wage, 
2w . Taking partial derivative of (17) with respect to 2w , we find that 
 
0)1( 2
2
1
2

 f
w
w
w
Ld  , as 0f .  
 
So, it confirms that the demand function is negatively sloped. The basic logic is that 
for a decline in informal wage, the firm substitutes formal labour by subcontracting to 
the informal sector. But, the demand for informal labour would be higher than that in the 
formal sector for the same production. Thus, this raises the subcontracting to the 
informal sector.   
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If the total working labour force in the economy is fixed at L , we can derive a 
unique equilibrium informal wage from the following condition. 
 
)()1()(
2
1
1 w
wfwL   .                                        (18) 
 
It is clear from above expression that one may not always find the full-employment 
equilibrium conditions in a developing economy. The informal wage moves freely to 
clear labour markets and to restore full-employment equilibrium. However, even at 
excess supply situation, we assume that the informal wage cannot go below the 
minimum level to absorb them in the informal sector. It suggests that (i) min2 ww   if 
LXX  21 , and (ii), min2 ww   if LXX  21 . In case (i), )( 21 XXL    is 
unemployed worker and gives downward pressure on the informal wage to 
accommodate them within the sector. But the wage cannot go further down if the level is 
already at minimum. In case (ii), the workers, who do not find employment in the formal 
sector, crowd in the informal sector and the labour market conditions would set a new 
equilibrium at separate informal wage with no unemployment in the economy. This has 
been demonstrated in Figure 2. If dL  be the demand for total labour by the firm, it cuts 
the supply curve L  at 2w . The full-employment condition prevails in the labour 
market. If the demand function is laid at below, i.e., dL , it cannot cut the supply curve 
at higher than the minimum informal wage, i.e., minw . Hence, the full employment 
equilibrium cannot be reached. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Determination of Informal Wage and Employment 
LdLdL
2w  
minw
 
L LL
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Lemma 1: In the long run, (i) 2w  depends on 1w ; (ii) 0
1
2 

w
w  if )( 21 XXL    
and  0
1
2




w
w  if )( 21 XXL   . 
 
Proof: (i) From (6) and (16), it is observed that the formal wage affects the demand 
for formal workers negatively, and informal workers positively. Since the labour 
required in the informal sector for the same amount of production would be higher than 
that in the formal sector, the net demand for labour in the informal sector would be 
positive. On the other hand, total scale of production comes down in response to a rise in 
the formal wage. This would further release workers from the formal sector and the total 
supply of workers to the informal sector may exceed the net demand for workers. If the 
demand effect is still stronger, the informal employment would, as a result, rise until the 
excess labour is exhausted, when )( 21 XXL    and the higher demand for informal 
workers will be met up by adjusting the informal wage when )( 21 XXL    (see 
Figure 3). The second case is discussed in the next at length. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Effect of a Rise Formal Wage on Outputs (Given Informal Wage and F) 
 
 
X XX~O
21, ww  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)(1 Fw  
 
 
2w  
)( 22 Xcw 
)(1 Fw  
R  
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(ii) If )( 21 XXL   , from (18), we can derive 2w : 
 
h
ww 12  ,                                                       (19) 
 
where 




 

1
)( 1wLhh , and 0h , and 0f . 
Differentiating (18) with respect to 1w , we find 
 
0
)1(
)1(
2
3
1
1
2





h
hwh
w
w

 .                                      (20) 
 
Since 0  and 0h , we find that 
1
2
w
w

  is ambiguous. As is mentioned above, 
the basic intuition is that, for a rise of formal wage, the firm would substitute formal 
workers by more subcontracting to workers in the informal sector. Again, the demand 
for informal workers would be greater than the number of workers supplied by the 
formal sector. The net demand for informal workers would be positive. On the other 
hand, overall production and, particularly, the formal production will decline due to a 
rise of the formal wage, and these further increases the supply of workers to the informal 
sector. At the full employment equilibrium (i.e., when )( 21 XXL   ), the net 
demand would be adjusted by raising the informal wage, if the demand dominates the 
supply. Therefore, we can safely conclude that a rise of formal wage does not 
necessarily pushes up the informal wage. ￭ 
 Now, we can derive sectoral outputs by substituting informal wage.  
 
Lemma 2:  If )( 122 www  , then (i) );();;( 122111 wFXXwFXX  and 
);( 1wFXX  , (ii) 01 



F
X , 02 

F
X , 0

F
X  and 02 



F
w . 
 
Proof: We find in the expression (19) that 2w  depends on 1w . Now substituting 
(19) into (8), we derive 1X  as follows:
8  
 
)1(1 


 LX .                                                    (20a) 
 
8 Note that if )(xfy   and 1 fh , then yyhf ))(( . 
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The formal output will be positive if L . It means that total output produced in 
the economy must be greater than the amount to be produced by employing fully in the 
informal sector. Similarly, we find that  
 




12
LX .                                                    (20b) 
 
In other words, the total workforce in the economy must be greater than the amount 
required to produce in the formal sector. And  
 
X .                                                          (20c) 
 
Now, taking partial derivative of (20a) with respect to F, we find  
 
0)()1[(
)1( 12
1



 Lw
F
X 
 .                               (21a) 
 
The sign of the derivative is ambiguous, because the first term within the third 
bracket is negative and the last term is positive. If F rises, it increases output raising the 
productivity of workers, given same number of workers. On the other hand, F replaces 
some formal workers and, hence, reduces output. Therefore, the net effect is uncertain.  
Similarly, taking the partial derivative of (20b) with respect to F, we find  
 
0
)1(
])1()[(
2
12






 wL
F
X .                                (21b) 
 
The sign of the derivative also shows an ambiguity. If F increases, the productivity 
of formal workers will be higher and, also, the output to be produced in the informal 
sector will be higher as a result of this. On the other hand, F also substitutes a few 
formal workers and they will crowd in the informal sector. Therefore, the directional 
change of informal output is ambiguous.  
Now, the partial derivative of (20c) with respect to F shows a positive sign. In other 
words, the total effect of R&D on overall production is always positive. It also suggests 
that the productivity of F must be substantially higher than that of workers’ substitution. 
Therefore, the effect of F on either 1X  or 2X  will be always positive so that net 
effect of total output gets positive. 
 
01 
  w
F
X .                                                  (21c) 
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Moreover, since the mobility of workers takes place freely across sectors as an 
indirect effect of an increase in F, it might affect the informal wage. Taking partial 
derivative of (19) with respect to F, we get 
   0})1(){()1(
)1( 1
2
22
12



 wLhh
h
w
F
w 
 .               (22) 
￭ 
 
For an increase of F, the scale of formal production would rise and, hence, an 
increase in demand for workers in the formal sector is observed. On the other hand, F 
would also substitute some formal workers and they would come to the informal sector. 
Hence, these two forces will work on informal wage in opposite directions and the net 
effect is uncertain. 
 
Lemma 3: If )( 122 www  , then 0
1
1 

w
X , 0
1
2 

w
X  and 0
1


w
X ; and (iii) 
01 



F
X . 
 
We have already assumed that the formal wage is exogenously fixed. Now, for any 
deliberate increase in formal wage, we want to see what the impact on sectoral outputs is. 
Taking partial derivaties of 20(a), 20(b) and 20(c), we get 
 
0
)1(1
1 




w
X ,                                                 (23a) 
 
0
)1(
2
1
2 




w
X ,                                               (23b) 
 
0
1

 
w
X .                                                   (23c) 
 
For a rise in formal wage, output in the concerned sector drops and informal output 
increases, and the net effect of total output will be negative. This is clear from the earlier 
discussions. 
Given these results, we can now write the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: A rise in formal wage (i) raises subcontracting to the informal sector 
and (ii) does not necessarily promote R&D and labour productivity in the formal sector 
firm even in the long-run. 
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Proof: (i) From (23b) we find that 0
1
2 

w
X . Since, the cost of production in the 
formal sector rises with an increase of formal wage, the firm offers more subcontracting 
to the informal sector.  
(ii) Substituting the value of 21, XX and 2w  in Equation (2), we find that the profit 
function depends only on F. Then solving F, we get (see appendix) 
 

 D
dw
dF 
1
* , where 0
D . 
 
So, the resultant effect of 1w  on F* is also ambiguous, i.e., 0
1 

dw
dF . We can also 
write that the effect of 1w  on labour productivity as follows:  
 
0)(1
)(
1
1
*
*
2
1 





dw
dFF
dw
F
d


. ￭ 
 
The basic intuition is as follows: If the formal wage rises, the production will take 
place more in the relatively cheaper informal sector as a substitution effect. This must 
raise the demand for informal workers. At the same time, whoever has lost a job in the 
formal sector come to the informal sector. If we add these factors, we may still find net 
positive demand for informal workers, because the demand for informal workers for 
same amount of production would be higher than the number of productive workers 
released from the formal sector. But, on the other hand, overall production falls, 
particularly in the formal sector, as a scale effect, and adds more to the supply of 
workers to the informal sector. Now, taking into account all these factors, movement of 
the informal wage is uncertain. If the demand effect is stronger, the informal wage goes 
up and if not, the wage comes down. If the informal wage rises, the share of formal 
production goes up through investing more on labour-saving R&D and thus promotes 
labour productivity of the sector. On the other hand, if the informal wage declines, the 
relative share of production in the formal sector also goes down. As a result, R&D and 
labour productivity in the formal sector definitely falls. Looking at these results, one can 
argue that if the formal wage pushes up informal wage, both R&D and labour 
productivity in the formal sector must rise and the rise of formal wage alone does not 
ensure an improvement in R&D and labour productivity of the sector. Therefore, we 
come to a conclusion that a rise in informal subcontracting, for any reason, may 
adversely affect in-house R&D and labour productivity in the formal sector even if the 
economy is fully employed. 
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4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
While the existing studies largely discuss the effect of international outsourcing on 
firm dynamics and welfare of an economy, but we study the effect of domestic 
subcontracting on in-house R&D investment and labour productivity of a typical firm in 
a developing economy. This paper develops a new framework to establish a production 
link between outputs produced in two segments, that is, the formal and informal sectors, 
where a share of the production is being subcontracted to the informal enterprises, a 
common practice in the developing economies. Therefore, the firm, in order to bypass 
expensive labour in in-house production, has a clear trade off, either spending more on 
labour saving R&D in the formal sector or subcontracting to the informal sector at a 
cheaper cost. The formal wage is determined by the government and/or by the labour 
market institution, whereas the informal wage is determined by the market. We argue 
that in response to a rise in wage of formal workers, the firm subcontracts to the 
informal sector at lower wage and does not have enough incentive for more in-house 
R&D. And, this acts as a binding condition of productivity improvement of formal 
workers.  
The study finds that in a typical developing economy the formal sector R&D and 
labour productivity are highly influenced by informal wage, but not by formal wage in 
the short run. Second, the informal wage is endogenously adjusted in response to a 
change in formal wage (i.e., exogenous factor) in the long run due to the changes in the 
supply and demand conditions of informal workers. Even in this case, a rise of formal 
wage does not necessarily influence R&D and labour productivity in the formal sector 
until and unless it raises the informal wage. Third, a relatively low informal wage hurts 
the R&D and resultant productivity in formal sector. In other words, the higher the 
difference of wages between two segments, the greater will be the subcontracting to the 
informal sector and lower would be the chances of improving R&D and labour 
productivity in the formal sector. Fourth, a relatively prosperous informal sector raises 
the amount of output to be produced in-house and expands the size of formal sector in 
the economy. It supports one justification for promoting economic condition of informal 
sector workers. Fourth, the government periodically revises the wage of workers in the 
formal sector for their incentive and welfare. This cannot confirm the improvement of 
labour productivity of the concerned workers, if the informal wage is not patronised 
simultaneously. Fifth, the informal wage is very low in some countries and even below 
the minimum level. But the enforcement of minimum wage and social securities has 
been one of the growing concerns in those countries for the benefits those poor and low 
income earners. Such measure could essentially be beneficial for them but also for the 
growth of labour productivity in the formal sector and overall industrial growth in the 
economy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Substituting the value of 21, XX  and 2w  in Equation (2), we find that the profit 
function depends only on F. Taking partial derivatives with respect to F, we find 
 
0)()( 2221111 
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 Z
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XwXw
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F
 .             (A1) 
 
Substituting (21) and (22), we rewrite it as follows: 
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There is a critical value of F, that is, *F , for which above condition will hold. In 
order to confirm it, the second order condition will be satisfied. Differentiating (A2) 
with respect to F , we find the following condition 
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If 0 , then *F  is maximum. Since our interest is to see the effect of 1w  on 
*F , now totally differentiating (A2) with respect to 1w  and rearranging the terms, we 
find 
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